F-35A fighter jet deal: What the Auditor General Revealed

Source: Canada 24 Press 

Ahead of the revelations made by the Auditor General Karen Hogan on June 10th that revealed a scandal and amateurish management in a key sector—Canada’s national defense—the Liberal Party, National Defence, Defence Construction Canada, and Public Services and Procurement Canada will have to answer serious questions related to the security of our nation in the matter of the F-35A fighter jet deal.

Auditor General, F-35A fighter jet deal

In 2022, Canada finalized an arrangement with the United States to purchase 88 F-35A fighter jets to replace its aging CF-18 Hornets (used by the Royal Canadian Air Force since 1983 and scheduled to be gradually withdrawn from service between 2025 and 2032). Two years later, the Auditor General has delivered a scathing verdict: costs have skyrocketed, infrastructure is years behind, pilot shortages persist, and critical components of operational readiness remain undefined. Once estimated at $19 billion, the project has now ballooned to $27.7 billion—and that doesn’t include at least $5.5 billion more required for full operational capability. The dream of a modern, sovereign air defense fleet is now riddled with delays, mismanagement, and unanswered strategic questions.

Part I: The Cost Explosion — $8.7 Billion in Two Years

When National Defence announced the F-35A acquisition, the projected cost was $19.0 billion. That estimate was based on 2019 data—already outdated by the time it was announced. The department ignored more recent figures from the U.S.-led Joint Strike Fighter Program Office (JSFPO) and admitted only 50% confidence in its own projections. Within two years, the figure jumped by 46%, reaching $27.7 billion in 2024.

The cost drivers are varied: global inflation, foreign exchange volatility, escalating prices for advanced munitions, and infrastructure complexity. However, much of the increase was preventable. The Department of National Defence did not monitor inflation or currency rates regularly and failed to revise its assumptions promptly. The Auditor General noted that cost reviews should have occurred annually but were not done until May 2024—after the overrun was already undeniable.

Part II: Delays and Deficiencies — Infrastructure That Doesn’t Exist

The contract is not just about the acquisition of 88 CF-35As—it requires cutting-edge hangars, weapons storage, secure communication infrastructure, and training environments. Yet Canada’s two main fighter bases—Cold Lake (AB) and Bagotville (QC)—are three years behind schedule, even though all subsequent aircraft would be sent to Canada starting in 2028.

The initial design phase, launched in 2020, aimed to support any of the three aircraft contenders. After a long debate about the price, the F-35 model A (the cheapest) was selected in 2022, but the facilities’ designs were no longer viable. By late 2023, the Joint Strike Fighter Program Office found Cold Lake’s infrastructure design only 10% mature—far below the 35% benchmark—and for Bagotville in Quebec, only 15% mature. This forced a redesign, resetting timelines to 2031.

In response, National Defence proposed an “interim operations plan,” relying on temporary buildings and retrofitted spaces. The JSFPO graded the plan “RED” in June 2024, warning of insufficient pilot training facilities and inadequate maintenance capacity.

Part III: Critical Shortages — Pilots and Technicians

In 2018, during an audit, the Auditor General found that Canada was facing a dire shortage of qualified fighter pilots. In 2024, six years later, nothing has changed. The current plan projects that by 2032–33, Canada will still not have enough trained pilots for full CF-35A operational capability.

The training program must convert current CF-18 pilots and prepare new ones, but capacity is lagging. Technician training is equally concerning. The RCAF faces a deficit of aircraft maintenance technicians, with expectations to close the gap only by 2033–34. The infrastructure, workforce, and timeline are misaligned—and that’s before the first Canadian aircraft even arrives.

Part IV: A Broken Risk Management System

The Auditor General found that National Defence adopted a reactive—not proactive—risk management approach. A 24-item risk register existed, but six high-impact items had no mitigation plans. Inflation and foreign exchange volatility were dismissed as “unlikely,” even as they wreaked havoc on costs.

Moreover, contingency plans were vague, missing timelines or cost estimates. When infrastructure delays materialized, the temporary solution was improvised after the fact—leading to even more cost overruns and scheduling pressures. The project lacked an integrated master schedule, had poorly coordinated plans, and faced serious staffing shortages—only 30% of key permanent positions had been filled by fall 2024 (14 out of 47, with a total of 246 positions to be eventually implemented).

Part V: What the Deal Really Covers (and What It Doesn’t)

Even after the $27.7 billion estimate, the government has admitted the CF-35A cannot reach full operational capability without another $5.5 billion. Why? Because the original scope excluded essential elements like:

• Upgraded power grids
• IT and cyber-resilient systems
• Aircraft storage (hangarettes)
• Weapons and parts depots
• Operations support in Canada’s North

These items were folded into a new $7 billion project under NORAD modernization—but 20 of its 33 components are essential just to make the F-35s usable at Cold Lake and Bagotville.

Part VI: Sovereignty at Stake — Are We Truly in Control?

Canada joined the Joint Strike Fighter program in 1997 and has contributed over $1 billion in partnership funds. Despite this, Canada is the last member of the consortium to commit to buying the jet.

Among the rising questions about sovereignty is the software that will be used on the F-35 fighters. Since the U.S.-Canada partnership is boiling, professionals have called for a review of the contract, fearing that the U.S. can insert a “kill switch” to disable or restrict the use of the fighters.

It’s a valid concern, since similar situations have occurred. To cite just two:

• France & the Exocet Missiles during the Falklands War (1982)
• Iraq, during the 2003 invasion, where U.S.-supplied systems were reportedly deactivated

Canada must consider whether it controls its own defense systems or rents them under conditional terms.

Part VII: Could Canada Have Built Its Own Jet?

Canada has high-tech aerospace firms: Bombardier (civilian), Magellan Aerospace (components), and CAE (simulation and training). A domestic fighter program would be ambitious and expensive—but not impossible. Sweden’s Gripen, South Korea’s KF-21, and Turkey’s KAAN fighter demonstrate that mid-sized nations can develop indigenous fighters.

Why wasn’t this considered more seriously? Canada spent decades deferring decisions while its CF-18 fleet aged into obsolescence. Now, it pays a premium for imported jets—with software it doesn’t control and infrastructure it hasn’t built.

Conclusion: A Strategic Failure or an Avoidable Crisis?

The F-35A fighter jet deal was meant to modernize Canada’s defense and fulfill NORAD and NATO obligations. Instead, it reveals a deeper problem: a national defense strategy shaped by foreign dependency, poor planning, and misaligned priorities.

The aircraft are years away. The bases aren’t ready. The pilots aren’t trained. The costs keep rising. And Ottawa’s risk plans remain reactive. In the absence of bold leadership and fiscal accountability, Canadians are being handed a multi-billion-dollar aircraft program that risks being underperforming, underprepared, and over budget.

Canada must learn from this failure. Sovereignty begins with capability—and that must include industrial independence, secure infrastructure, and strategic foresight.